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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
DOUGLAS HOLMES, a minor, by 
Howard Holmes as guardian ad 
litem, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
J. El·JOS NELSON, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 8726 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action brought by Douglas Holmes, 
a minor of four years of age, through Howard 
Holmes, his guardian ad litem, to recover damages 
for injuries sustained on the 11th day of July, 1955 
on 800 West Street in Woods Cross, Davis County, 
Utah when the plaintiff, Douglas Holmes, was struck 
by an automobile driven by the defendant (R. 1-2). 
The case was tried to a jury before the Honorable 
John F. Wahlquist, Judge of the District Court of 
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Davis County, on February 21 and 23, 1957. The 
Jury returned a verdict of "no cause of ·action" in 
favor of the defendant. 
A Motion For New Trial was filed by plain-
tiff's attorney (R. 9) on a number of grounds. On 
June 7, 1957 a new trial was granted on the ground 
that the verdict was against a clear preponderance 
of the evidence ( R. 15). 
The defendant filed a Petition For Intermedi-
ate Appeal from the order granting a new trial 
(R. 56-69). The Petition was granted by order of 
this Court on July 31, 1957. 
·The question before the Court on the appeal 
is whether the trial judge abused his discretion in 
granting a new trial, which in turn raises the ques-
tion of whether the verdict is against a clear pre-
ponderance of the evidence. 
STATE ME NT OF FACTS 
In the Statement Of Facts and Argument which 
follows we shaH refer to the parties as they were 
referred to in the District Court, that is plaintiff 
and defendant. The Record consists of two volun1es, 
one of which is made up of the Motions and Plead-
ings and the like and the other of which is the trans-
cript. We shall refer to the Transcript by the term 
"Tr. ____ , and the Record by the term "R. ____ ,. 
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The accident out of which this action arises 
occurred on July 11, 195'5 at about 8:20 P.M. on 
800 West Street in Woods Cross, Davis County, 
Utah. The scene of the accident is illustrated in a 
general way by Defendant's Exhibits "A" through 
"D" and Plaintiff's Exhibits 1 through 4, none of 
which pictures was taken at the time of the acci-
dent (Tr. 45). 
Plaintiff resides in a home with his parents 
on the west side of 800 West Street, next door to a 
church. At a point approximately between the church 
and the Holmes property there is a telephone pole 
which is located by the side of the road. 800 West 
Street extends north and south ( Tr. 15-20, Exhibits 
"A" - "E"). The oiled surface of the highway is 
approximately 38 feet 6 inches wide ( Tr. 38). The 
shoulders on each side of the road are approximately 
10 feet wide (Tr. 50). There is a row of trees im-
mediately south of the Holmes property on the west 
side of the street (Exhibits "A" - "D"). The point 
of impact was approximately 4 feet 6 inches onto 
the east side of the road, and at a point approxi-
mately directly east of the telephone pole (Exhibit 
"C", Tr. 21). The speed limit in the area at the time 
was 30 miles per hour ( Tr. 48) . 
The defendant was building a house on the 
east side of 800 West Street some distance south 
of the Holmes property and the point where the 
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accident occurred (Tr. 3-12). On the evening of 
July 11, 1955 he had been out to this house with 
his wife and wife's son delivering some material 
(Tr. 12). Mter delivering the material the defen-
dant left the area of the house and started north 
on 800 West Street. Visibility was good except that 
it was in the dusk of the evening, the sun having 
set that evening at 8:02P.M. (Tr. 179). The de-
fendant had his car lights on ( Tr. 113) and prior 
to the accident had reached the approximate speed 
of 20 to 25 miles per hour (Tr.54). As he approach-
ed the immediate area of the accident he observed 
children on the west side of the road. He also ob-
served a car approaching from the north and ob-
served the children move back to permit the south-
bound car to pass ( Tr. 22) . 
The defendant's car and the south-bound car 
passed each other at a point about 125 feet south 
of the point of impact (Tr. 23). When the defen-
dant was about 60 to 75 feet from the point of 
impact he saw one of the children, the plaintiff, 
come running into the street ( Tr. 23-35). The de-
fendant immediately applied his brakes but the child 
continued to run diagonally across the street and 
towards his automobile. The child was struck by 
the left front fender of the automobile. At the time 
the child was struck the automobile was traveling 
5 to 6 miles per hour (Tr. 23-24). 
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It afterwards developed that the plaintiff and 
some other children had been playing ball in the 
Holmes yard by the church (Tr. 53). One of the 
children threw the ball and it was missed and went 
across the street. There is some confusion in the 
Record as to just what happened after that. Mary 
Jean Holmes, age 9, a cousin of the plaintiff (Tr. 
51-52) testified that a boy named Billy and the 
plaintiff took out after the ball (Tr. 54). They 
waited for a south-bound car and after it had passed 
Billy ran across the street and when he had gotten 
across the street Douglas started across ( Tr. 54) . 
Robert Holmes, the plaintiff's brother, age 13, testi-
fied that he was not sure whether Billy crossed the 
street before or after the accident. According to 
Donna Stevens, 15 years of age, who lives in the 
area, the plaintiff was standing out by the side of 
the road all by himself and crossed the road at the 
same time she did (Tr. 69), but admits that she 
· had had time to cross the street on her bicycle and 
get to her home ( Tr. 70), which was some distance 
south of the scene of the accident. 
The only evidence as to what the defendant saw 
or could or should have seen and the manner in 
which the accident occurred is that of the defendant 
and his wife. Starting on page 3 of the Transcript 
the defendant testified: 
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"A I had been to a home I was con-
structing for Irvin Layton. 
"Q And where is that home? 
"A Oh, that is approximately In the 
middle of that half-mile block? 
"Q And you had pulled- now there are 
two homes there together, are there not? 
"A Yes. 
"Q Which house were you in front of, 
the north or south house? 
"A I was in front of the north one. 
"Q In front of the north one, and you 
proceeded to drive your car onto the street 
and drive north along the highway. 
"A Yes. 
"Q Now, how fast - what was the 
maximum speed that you went at as you drove 
north? 
"A The maximum speed, I judge would 
be 25 miles per hour. 
"Q 25 miles an hour. And at the time 
you started up the street you could see people, 
individuals, or humans in the vicinity of the 
Holmes home and on both sides of the street, 
could you not? 
"A When I was about half way up 
there. 
"Q Not until you were half way up? 
"A I started to drive up a short dis-
tance. 
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"A When I was about 60 to 70 feet from 
him, approximately. 
"Q 60 to 70 feet from him. Now, did 
you hav~ your lights on as you went north? 
"A Yes, sir. 
"Q Now, you are acquainted with the 
fact, are you not, that there is a ward meeting 
house immediately north of the Holmes resi-
dence? 
A Yes, sir." 
On page 8 of the transcript he testified: 
"Q Now, do you have any idea where 
you were, Mr. Nelson: Excuse me, I want 
to find this other question. Withdraw that. 
Now, as you drove your car north on 8th 
West, were there any other automobiles or ve-
hicles in the road? 
"A There was one coming from down 
the street. 
"Q 'That was coming from what direc-
tion? 
"A Coming from the north. 
"Q Coming from the north. And what 
time did you pass that vehicle? 
"A I passed the vehicle, I estimate 
about a hundred feet south of where the point 
of impact was.'' 
On page 14 of the transcript he testified: 
"Q Now, what was the first thing you 
did after you came out of the Layton home? 
"A Turn north. 
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"Q Let's go back before that. You had 
just finished your conversation with Mr. Lay-
ton. Now, you are walking out the front door 
of the home. What's the first thing you did? 
"A I went out and got in the car and 
started the motor. 
"Q Did you do anything else when you 
got in the car without starting the motor? 
"A No, sir. 
"Q Did you turn the lights on? 
"A I turne'd the lights on immediately 
after I started the motor. 
"Q All right, right after you got the 
lights turned on the car started, what was 
the next thing that you did? 
"A I started my car to moving and 
drove off the yard onto the street. 
"Q When you got to the road which 
direction did you turn? 
"A I turned north. 
"Q Now, as you drove north on this 
street, did you observe any children. First of 
all, let me back up. Do you know where the 
Holmes' home is on that street? 
"A Yes. 
"Q Do you know where the church is 
on that street? 
"A Yes, sir. 
"Q Where is the church with reference 
to the Holmes' home? 
8 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"A Just north of this driveway, the 
Holmes' driveway. 
On page 22 of the transcript he testified: 
"Q Now, as you drove out of this yard 
where you had been delivering this material 
and starting down the street and starting 
north on the street there, did you observe any 
other automobiles on the highway? 
"A Yes, there was one coming from the 
north facing me. 
"Q And, what was the first thing that 
you noticed about that automobile? 
"A He had his lights on. 
"Q How far had you traveled-let me 
put it this way; about how far were you from 
this telephone pole at the time you saw this 
car coming from the north? 
"A Oh, a hundred and twenty-five feet, 
approximately. No, not when I seen it coming 
from the north. 
"Q When you saw it coming from the 
north? 
"A I saw it coming from the north be-
fore that. 
"Q About where were you when you 
saw the car coming from the north? 
"A Oh, about 200 feet from where I 
left. 
"Q Now, as you drove north along that 
highway, did you see any children up there 
in the area of the telephone pole? 
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"A Yes, at that point I see the children 
move away from the headlights of this other 
car coming. 
"Q Which direction did these children 
move that you saw? 
"A To the west side of the street. 
"Q did you subsequently, or did you 
thereafter pass this car that was coming from 
the north? 
"A You mean the distance? 
"Q Did your car pass that car that was 
coming from the north? 
"A Yes. 
"Q Approximately how far were you 
from the telephone pole when your car passed 
that car that was coming from the north? 
"A About a hundred and twenty-five 
feet. 
"Q Now, did you ever see the boy, 
Douglas Holmes prior to the time your car 
actually collided with him? 
"A Did I see him before the car col-
lided with him? Yes. 
"Q Now, where was he when you first 
saw him? 
"A He was coming off the sidewalk be-
yond the telephone pole and a little beyond the 
Holmes' driveway. 
"Q Now, when you say beyond, which 
direction do you mean? 
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"Q North of the telephone pole? 
"A Yes, the telephone pole. 
"Q What was he doing when you first 
saw him? 
"A He was running toward me. Dig-
ging across the road, coming right toward me. 
"Q And how far was your car away 
from where the accident occurred, the point of 
impact, when you first saw this child running 
into the street? 
"A Oh, approximately 60 feet. 
"Q Now, what did you do when you 
saw this child? 
"A I applied the brakes as soon as I 
could react to do so. 
"Q Did you observe the child during 
the entire time he came across the street? 
"A Yes, sir. 
"Q Just tell the jury what he was do-
ing as he came across the street. 
"A Well, he came running with his 
head down, awful low to the ground. 
"Q Now, did you observe any action 
on the child's part immediately prior to the 
impact? 
"A As he came in just the headlights he 
straightened up and throwed his head up in 
the air. 
"Q How fast had you been driving as 
you came north on this street? 
"A About 20 to 25 miles per hour. 
11 
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"Q Do you have any .estimate as. to 
about how fast you were going at the time 
the car and the boy collided? 
"A Oh, 4 or 5 or 6 miles per hour. 
"Q Did you observe what happened to 
the boy? First of all, what part of your car 
struck the boy? 
"A As near as I could tell, the head-
light and the bumper. 
''Q On what side of the car? 
"A \That would be on the left-hand side 
of the car. 
"Q And, about where in the highway 
did the accident occur? 
"A Occurred in the right-hand lane of 
the highway. 
"Q Would that be the east or west lane? 
"A That would be the east lane. 
"Q What lane were you traveling in 
as you drove your car north on the highway? 
"A The east lane. 
"Q What side of the street did the boy 
come from? 
"A He came from the west side of the 
street, the left-hand side." 
Continuing on page 34, he said: 
"MR. HANSON: You were at a point 
200 feet south of where this accident happen-
ed. When you were at a point 200 feet south 
of where the accident happened, did you an-
12 
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ticipate that a child was going to run into the 
street in front of your car? 
"A No, sir. 
"THE COURT: After this car passed 
you going the other way, you saw the child. 
Then where was the child when you first saw 
it after the car passed you? 
"A The child was coming off the side-
walk north of the Holmes' driveway. 
"THE COURT: He was how far off the 
sidewalk at that time? 
"A Off the sidewalk, oh-directly off 
the road probably 10 or 12 feet. 
"THE COURT: 10 or 12 feet off the 
sidewalk or off the road? 
"A Off the road. He was just leaving 
the sidewalk when I observed him the first 
time. 
"THE COURT: How far would he have 
to go from there to where you hit him? 
"A Oh, about 30 feet, I should say, I 
never measured it. 
"THE COURT: In other words what you 
Lestified to, the little boy traveled 30 feet 
while you were traveling 75? 
"A Well, I don't know the exact dis-
tances. 
"'THE COURT: How far away were you 
when you saw this little boy? 
"A I was approximately 75 feet. 
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"A Yes, sir. 
"THE COURT: And, the little boy would 
be how far, 30 feet? 
"A Oh, something about that distance. 
"THE COURT: Your witness. 
"MR. HANSON: I have no question. 
"THE COURT: Your witness. 
"MR. PATTERSON: And, as I under-
stand you to the Judge's question, Douglas 
Holmes ran approximately 30 feet while you 
were traveling 75 feet? 
"A Well, that could be. I am judging 
the distance is all, I don't know measure-
ments." 
Mrs. Hattie B. Nelson, the wife of the defen-
dant, testified, beginning on page 196 : 
"Q Now, as you were driving down that 
highway, did you observe any other cars on 
the road? 
lane. 
"A Yes, sir. 
"Q And, what car did you observe? 
"A 'There was one in the south-bound 
"Q And where was that car when you 
first observed it? 
"A At about the hedge. 
"Q And, will you state whether or not 
the car had it's lights on? 
"A Yes, sir. 
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"Q Will you tell me whether or not you 
saw the children before you saw the car or 
whether you saw the car before you saw the 
children? 
"A I seem to see them about the same 
time, I think, I might have seen the car-no, 
I think I saw them at the same time. 
"Q Did you observe what the children 
were doing, if anything? 
"A They backed off. 
"Q By 'backed off' where did they hack 
off to? 
"A 'Toward the sidewalk. 
"Q On which side of the road? 
"A On the west side. 
"Q And then did you observe this car? 
"A Yes. 
"Q What did you observe the car do? 
''A The car passed us. 
"Q Now, where were you with refer-
ence to these trees at the time the car passed 
you? 
"A Passing the trees. 
"Q After the car passed you, what hap-
pened? 
"A We passed the children. 
"Q And where were these children that 
you passed? 
"A In front of the Holmes' property. 
15 
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"Q Did you observe children there as 
you went by the Holmes' property, I mean, 
observe these children as you went by the 
Holmes' property. 
"A Yes. 
"Q How many children did you ob-
serve? 
"A 'Two. 
"Q Where were these children at? 
"A On the west side. 
"Q And where were they in reference 
to the shoulder? 
"A On the shoulder. 
"Q Now, did you observe any other 
child at any time, either on the highway or 
in the vicinity of the highway? 
"A No, sir. 
"Q Did you observe the child that was 
later struck? 
"A Yes, sir. 
"Q Where was that child when you first 
observed him? 
"A He was running in the south-bound 
lane. 
"Q And, about where was your car with 
reference to these trees at the time you first 
observed the child. 
"A North. 
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"A South 
"Q Now, when you first saw the child 
in the road did you recognize it as a child? 
"A No, sir. 
"Q What did you think it was? 
"A I thought it was a dog. 
"Q Now, did you at any time feel the 
car in which you were riding slowing down 
prior to the time that the child was hit? 
"A Yes, sir. 
"Q Will you state when the first time 
you felt your car slow down? 
"A Before we passed the car. 
"Q That was the south-bound automo-
bile? 
"A Yes. 
"Q Did you feel any violent applica-
tion of the brakes of the car in which you were 
riding? 
"A As we passed the children. 
"Q And that was in front of the Holmes' 
property? 
"A Yes, sir. 
"Q Will you state whether or not you 
felt this violent application of brakes prior 
to the time you saw the child, or before you 
saw it? 
"A Before. 
"Q Now, did you see the actual impact 
between the car and the child? 
17 
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"A I saw him throw his head up and 
I saw his hair in his eyes. 
"Q Do you have any estimate as to how 
fast your car was traveling at that moment? 
"A At the point when we hit him the 
car had slowed until we had almost come to 
a stop. 
Upon the basis of this evidence the jury re-
turned a verdict in defendant's favor. Upon a Mo-
tion For New Trial the court set the verdict aside 
as being "against a clear preponderance of the evi-
dence" ( R. 15). We believe the verdict was not 
"against a clear preponderance of the evidence" and 
that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial judge 
to grant a new trial. We will discuss the points in 
that order. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE VERDICT OF THE JURY WAS NOT AGAINST 
A CLEAR PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE. 
POINT II 
IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR THE 
TRIAL JUDGE TO GRANT A NEW TRIAL. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE VERDICT OF THE JURY WAS NOT AGAINST 
A CLEAR PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE. 
In the case of Roche v. Zee, 1 Utah (2d) 193, 
264 P. ('2d) 855, which involved an appeal from 
lR 
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a Motion To Dismiss made by the defendant, which 
the court granted after the jury had returned aver-
dict in the defendant's favor, this court dismissed 
the appeal on the ground that the appeal should have 
been taken from the verdict rather than the motion. 
This court held that: "The jury having found for 
defendant, the review should be in the light most 
favorable to defendant." The case is not in point 
except that it restates the rule which should have 
guided the trial court's review of the evidence in 
ruling upon the motion for a new trial and the rule 
which we submit should guide this court in its re-
view of the evidence to determine whe'ther or not 
the trial judge erred, or that he abused his discre-
tion in granting a new trial. 
Estimates as to the distance in which the de-
fendant's car could have stopped vary from 53 feet 
( Tr. 113) , assuming a road surface having the 
highest coefficient of friction (Tr. 129), to 6'5 feet 
( Tr. 191) , assuming there was gravel on the sur-
face of the road and a coefficient of friction of 
55<Jo. Since there was evidence that there was gravel 
on the surface of the highway and the defendant 
stated that the plaintiff was 60 to 75 feet away 
at the time he started into the highway, we might 
argue that the court should assume the shortest 
distance and lowest coefficient of friction and that 
the defendant, even discounting perception time but 
19 
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including only braking distance and reaction time, 
could not possibly have stopped his automobile less 
than 5 feet beyond the point of impact. We do not, 
however, feel that this Court should engage in such 
hair splitting. As was said in Howard v. Ringsby 
Truck Lines, 2 Utah (2d) 65, 269 P. (2d) 295, in 
which the argument was made that a truck could 
have been stopped before colliding with a jeep and, 
assuming plaintiff's evidence, the defendant would 
have had 2.56 seconds in which to react: 
''During this brief interval, Byington had 
to react to the danger, determine a course of 
action and stop a truck traveling 45 miles per 
hour. We are in accord with the following 
apropos statement made by the court in Rolli-
son v. Wabash R. Co., 252 Mo. 525, 160 S.W. 
994, 999: 
"' * * * To predicate negligence on two 
seconds of time is in and of itself a nlonumen-
tal refinement. We cannot adjudicate negli-
gence on such pulse beats and hair splitting, 
such airy nothings of surmise.' " 
The court went on to say: 
"The showing of a mere possibility that 
the accident might have been avoided is in-
sufficient." 
That case is also important in that it also rec-
ognizes what might be termed "perception time". 
The court said: 
"Human reactions are not instantaneous 
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and the time required to react varies accord-
ing to the nature of the danger and the sur-
rounding circumstances." 
As brought out by· the evidence ( Tr. 119) , per-
ception time is the time required to perceive and un-
derstand the dangerous situation as distinguished 
from reaction time, which is the time it takes for an 
individual to react to danger after he actually sees 
and is aware of the danger. As we have stated, li-
ability or the lack of it should not be predicated on 
seconds of time or fractions of feet. To do so would 
be to assume that witnesses are exactly correct in 
their estimates of time and distances, which is ob-
viously never the case. Rather, we should look at 
the evidence in a general way. Looking at this evi-
dence in a general way we find no evidence of ex-
cessive speed on the part of the defendant. It is 
admitted that the defendant saw the children on the 
side of the road and the plaintiff prior to the acci-
dent. There is no evidence of any failure to keep a 
proper lookout. As the defendant approached the 
area in which the accident occurred another car was 
approaching from the north and the defendant ob-
served the children move back to allow the south-
bound car to pass. There was nothing in his actions 
to that point on which to predicate any findings of 
negligence. Since the children had observed and sur-
rendered the right of way to the south-bound auto-
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mobile, it was only logical to assume they would 
likewise surrender the right of way to the north-
bound automobile. 
Some time after the· defendant's car had 
passed the south-bound automobile at a point 
100 to 125 feet from the place where the plain-
tiff was struck, the plaintiff started across the 
highway. The defendant estimates that he was 
60 to 75 feet from the point of impact when this oc-
curred. It would take some time thereafter for the 
defendant to realize that the plaintiff intended to 
cross the road in front of his car and was apparently 
unaware of the approach of his vehicle. When he 
came to that realization the defendant would still 
have to react to the situation and stop his vehicle. 
If the defendant was traveling at a speed of 25 miles 
per hour, or roughly 37¥2 feet per second, he had 
only two seconds in which to perceive the danger, 
react to it and stop his vehicle if we assume he was 
75 feet from the point of impact at the time. Of 
course, if he was traveling at a faster rate of speed 
or the distance was less then the defendant would 
have even less time. 
Whether the defendant might conceivably have 
been able to stop his car and was, therefore, negli-
gent in not doing so is not, in the real sense, the 
issue involved here. The jury, whose duty it is to 
find the facts, has already resolved that issue by 
its verdict in favor of the defendant. The question 
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that is involved, regardless of what our personal 
opinions may be, is whether or not they might, as 
reasonable men, have resolved the issue as they did 
and, having resolved the issue, whether or not that 
determination is contrary to the preponderance of 
the evidence. 
We submit that the finding of the jury is not 
only the most logical one, but any other conclusion 
requires a process of mental gymnastics not war-
ranted by the evidence. 
!The only other evidence which may have some 
bearing on the issues of negligence is the fact that 
the defendant, in stopping his vehicle, left skid 
marks, the overall length of which was 52 feet 3 
inches ( Tr. 21) . It should be pointed out, however, 
that these measurements were from the place on 
the road where the skid marks started to the place 
where they stopped, which was at the front wheel 
of the vehicle and included the length of the 
automoblle and a short break of approximate-
ly 3 feet in length where there were no skid 
Pettingill v. Perkins, 2 Utah (2d) 2'66, 272 P. 
Alvarado v. Tucker, 2 Utah (2d) 16, 268 P. (2d) 
986. In the case referred to the defendant struck an 
eleven year old girl who started across the street 
but, seeing a car headed north, ran along parallel to 
it until it passed her and then ran behind it west-
ward across the street and directly into the path of 
the defendant who was driving from the north. The 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
defendant laid down 50 feet of skid marks, includ-
ing the length of the car, which indica ted a speed 
from 25 to 30 miles per hour. The court pointed out 
that this evidence did not sustain a finding that the 
defendant was traveling at an excessive rate of 
speed, the court being entitled to assume the lesser 
rate. The court went on to say: 
"Even if the plain tiff were correct in 
her contention that the evidence would jus-
tify a finding of 5 or 10 miles per hour in 
excess of the speed limit, she would still be 
faced with the necessity of proving that such 
excess of speed was the proximate cause of 
the injury." · 
The evidence in this case is that the speed limit 
in the area concerned was 30 miles per hour, so that 
we have no evidence of excessive speed. Further-
more, there is no evidence except that which is based 
on conjecture and assumption, not warranted by the 
evidence, that the defendant could have stopped his 
car in sufficient time to avoid the accident even if 
traveling at a lesser rate of speed. While the facts in 
Pettingill v. Perkins, 2 Utah (2d) 266, 272 P. 
(2d) 185, which involved the death of a 26 month 
old boy who was killed when struck by an automo-
bile, are not in point, the concluding language of 
that case might well summarize the evidence in this 
case. The court said: 
"The jury might well have found that 
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there was no negligence on the part of the de-
fendant. It would take a pull and a long 
stretch to say the evidence required the con-
clusion that defendant was guilty of negli-
gence which proximately caused the death of 
the child." 
POINT II 
IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR THE 
TRIAL JUDGE TO GRANT A NEW TRIAL. 
Ordinarily the deliberations which go on in a 
jury room are inviolate and we must presume that 
the jury considered those issues which were put to 
them and followed the instructions of the court in 
that regard. That is not the case here, however. 
After the verdict had been returned and the court 
dismissed the foreman of the jury and one other 
juror desired to discuss the case with the court, and 
the following conversation occurred (Tr. 216): 
"JURY FOREMAN: What the jury 
wanted to do was award the plaintiff his dam-
ages, but felt he would be entitled to no other 
damages, but then they would ·have been ren-
dering the man guilty of something that was 
still a question in our minds. 
"MR. HANSON: Do I understand that 
there was a question in your minds as to 
whether or not this defendant was guilty of 
negligence? 
"THE COURT: Let me ask this. 
"MR. HANSON: I didn't mean to inter-
fere. 
"THE COURT: Did the six people that 
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signed this verdict sign the verdict because 
they feel the man was not negligent? 
"FOREMAN: That's right. 
"THE COURT: Or because they felt 
that the damages were nominal? 
"FOREMAN: No, because he was not 
guilty of negligence. 
"THE COURT: Is that the opinion of the 
six that signed? 
"FOREMAN: Yes. 
"THE COURT: Was there any method of 
chance used? 
"FOREMAN: No. 
"THE COURT: No method of chance 
whatsoever? 
"FOREMAN: No. 
"THE COURT: There were some of them 
that would have liked to have awarded aver-
dict for specials only? 
"FORMEAN: They felt the man had a 
moral obligation. 
"THE COURT: But not a legal obliga-
tion? 
"FOREMAN: Not a legal obligation. In 
other words, they felt he was not negligent 
in his actions, but that he did have a moral 
obligation. That was the question the jury 
wanted to ask you that we were not permitted 
to ask. 
"THE COURT: If that is their opinion, 
the verdict is correct. Is there further en-
quiries of the foreman of the jury? 
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"MR. KUNZ: Mr. Beazer would like to 
have a question here. 
"MR. BEAZER: That was my question. 
"MR. KUNZ: Mr. Beazer, would there 
have been sufficient on a verdict - would 
there have been sufficient people agree on a 
verdict to a ward the special damages? 
"MR. BEAZER: I think there would. 
That's correct. 
"FOREMAN: Well, at one time during 
our discussion there was. 
"THE COURT: Was there ever six of 
them who felt that Mr. Nelson was negligent? 
"1\XR. BEAZER: No. 
"THE COURT: Your verdict is correct. 
It may be filed." 
This conversation is set out to illustrate that 
the jury understood the issues which they were to 
deliberate. It appears that they were sympathetic 
in that they wanted to award the plaintiff his dam-
ages but felt that in rendering such a verdict they 
would be finding the defendant guilty of negligence 
and that they did not return a verdict because the 
six people who signed the verdict were of the opi-
nion that the defendant was not negligent. We have 
devoted the first part of our argument to a discus-
sion of why the jury might reasonably so find, and 
will not repeat that argument here except to reiter-
ate our conviction that their verdict was justified 
by the evidence. 
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Since the trial court gran ted a new trial on only 
one theory, that the verdict of the jury was con-
trary to a preponderance of the evidence, and so 
indica ted by this order, we do not have to specu-
late on what the court may have had in mind, but in 
determining whether or not he abused his preroga-
tive limit our inquiry to that one point. In this re-
spect the case is similar to Bowden v. Denver & Rio 
Grande Western Railroad Company, 2 Utah (2d) 
444, 286 P. (2d) 240. In that case the court granted 
a new trial upon the ground that two particular in-
structions were erroneous. The court held that the 
instructions when read together with the other in-
structions were not prejudicial. The court went on: 
"Still addressing ourselves to the speci-
fic ground upon which the new trial was 
granted, as distinguished from the general 
discretion reposed in the trial court, which 
herein was expressly renounced, there is yet 
another aspect of this case which we believe 
should have dissuaded that court from grant-
ing a new trial, even if it thought technical 
error had been committed. There is a most 
important difference between this case and 
the Butz case hereinabove discussed. In the 
latter, the trial court had deprived the plain-
tiff of a trial by jury and resolved all of the 
issues of fact against him as a matter of law, 
whereas in this case the matter was submitted 
to a jury and the facts were found against 
the plaintiff. We reaffirm our con1mitment 
that ' "The right of jury trial * * * is * * * a 
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right so fundamental and sacred to the citi-
zen * * * (that it) should be jealously guard-
ed by the courts."' But once having been 
granted such right and a verdict rendered, 
it should not be regarded lightly nor over:.. 
turned without good and sufficient reason; 
nor should a judgment be disturbed merely be-
cause of error. Only when there is error both 
substantial and prejudicial, and when there 
is a reasonable likelihood that the result would 
have been different without it, should error 
be regarded as sufficient to upset a judgment 
or grant a new trial." 
Since the court in granting the new trial in this 
case has put it solely on the ground of the verdict's 
being contrary to the preponderance of the evidence, 
the court would have appeared to have limited the 
basis for granting the motion and we are not faced 
with the broad powers of discretion which are or-
dinarily vested in the trial court. 
We agree with the holding in the case of Bowden 
v. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Com-
pany, supra. If a decision which a jury, after care-
ful consideration, has arrived at and which is war-
ranted under the evidence is set aside without good 
grounds for doing so, that is, merely because the 
trial court did not happen to agree with the result 
reached, then the jury system becomes a nullity. 
1There is yet another element that should be 
considered. The trial of an action of the nature and 
importance of the case we are considering repre-
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sents a considerable investment of time and money 
not only on the part of the parties and their counsel 
but also on the part of the State, who provides the 
forum, the officers of the court and the jury. The 
investment does not end here, however. As lawyers 
and judges, who by their daily intimate association 
with these problems, we become somewhat calloused 
and indifferent to what they represent to the parties 
involved. We are prone to forget the worry and men-
tal anguish, the strife and contention and the dis-
illusionment which parties involved sometimes suf-
fer. This is no indictment. Rather it is a necessary 
adjunct of a system which provides them with an 
opportunity for a fair and impartial hearing of their 
grievance. It does suggest, however, that lawsuits 
should have an end; that these rna tters should be 
put to rest; and that the hopes and fears of the par-
ticipants should not be resurrected unless the sys-
tem has failed in its basic responsibility, that is to 
provide a fair and impartial hearing. 
Where the matters in dispute have been pre-
sented to a jury and where those matters have been 
decided by a jury upon competent evidence from 
which a jury of reasonable persons could so conclude, 
the verdict should not be set aside merely because the 
court happens to disagree with the result or because 
the jury might, on some theory or another, have 
found otherwise. As was said in Reynolds v. TV. TV. 
Clyde ~Company, 5 Utah (2d) 151, 298 Pac: (2~d) 
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530, in which the verdict reached depended upon 
which of two eye witnesses the jury believed: 
"There were but two eye witnesses to the 
incident, the plaintiff and the defendant flag-
man. Their testimony was diametrically op-
posed, and there was more than ample evi-
dence which, if believed by the jury, would 
support its verdict. We sustain such verdicts 
as a matter of course, as many times we have 
said we must do. Only those verdicts that ap-
pear to be unsupported by any credible evi-
dence that would justify them in the minds of 
reasonable men, do we disturb. That is the 
jury system. There is no lack of such evidence 
here, but on the contrary, there is sufficient 
competent evidence from which a jury of 
reasonable persons could conclude there was 
non-negligence on the part of defendants and/ 
or contributory negligence on the part of 
plaintiff, or an absence of cause and effect. 
"Plain tiff presents her case on appeal by 
reciting facts tending most favorably to prove 
her claim. The opposite approach must be 
adopted, and it hardly bears repeating that in 
a case like this the factual situation will be 
reviewed on appeal in a light most favorable 
to the party prevailing below.'' 
CONCLUSION 
The claims of the plain tiff who sought to re-
cover from the defendant for injuries he sustained 
in an auto-pedestrian accident were presented to a 
jury for its decision under instructions of which, 
as far as we are aware at this time, plaintiff has 
no complaint. The jury understood the issue before 
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them, as indicated by the conversation between two 
of the jurors and the court which appears in the 
record. The jury, after a careful consideration, al-
though sympathetic with the plaintiff, decided that 
the defendant was not negligent. Their decision 
is supported by evidence from which they could 
reasonably so conclude. In fact, the preponderance of 
the evidence argues in favor of their decision. Never-
theless the trial court, who apparently disagreed 
with their decision, set their verdict aside and grant-
ed a new trial. His actions in this regard were not 
only contrary to the weight of the evidence but failed 
to take in to account every presumption which should 
have been made in favor of the correctness of that 
verdict. In doing so the court expressly limited the 
ground on which he made his decision, to the only 
issue which is now before the court, that is whether 
or not the verdict is against the preponderance of 
the evidence. 
It is sub1nitted that the court erred in so doing. 
in so doing. 
Respectfully submitted, 
EDWIN B. CANNON 
DON J. HANSON 
CANNON AND HANSON 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Appellant 
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